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Abstract. Revealed preference analysis provides a definitive method to test for optimizing
behavior. However, it has been criticized because it fails to allow for approximate satisfac-
tion of optimizing behavior. In this paper, I outline some possible solutions to this problem.
These solutions suggest some novel measurements of goodness-of-fit in parametric demand
estimation.
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Goodness-of-Fit in Demand Analysis
Hal R. Varian
There are two approaches to the empirical analysis of consumer choice behavior. Para-
metric analysis proceeds by postulating a functional form for a utility function, deriving
the associated demand equations, and estimating the parameters of the resulting system
of equations. The estimates of the parameters can be used to test the maximization hy-
pothesis, forecast demand, or do welfare analysis. Nonparametric analysis uses revealed
preference techniques to achieve the same ends.
Samuelson (1938) and Houthakker (1950) were the first to develop the implications of
the revealed preference idea for economic theory, but Afriat (1967) was the first to pursue
its implications for empirical demand analysis. Subsequently Diewert (1973), Diewert
and Parkan (1985), and Varian (1982a), (1982b) extended Afriat's analysis in a number
of directions. More recently, several authors such as Browning (1984), Bronars (1987),
Deaton (1985) Green and Srivastava (1985), (1986), Houtman and Maks (1987), Landsburg
(1981), Manser and McDonald (1988), and Swofford and Whitney (1986) have contributed
to nonparametric analysis.
The aspect of nonparametric analysis that I wish to examine in this paper has to do
with the goodness-of-fit of the utility maximization model-what does it mean to say
that some consumer behavior is "almost" consistent with maximization? To motivate this
discussion let us consider the violation of the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference
depicted in Figure 1. Here we have x* revealed preferred to x' and x' revealed preferred to
X'. However, the size of the violation is not large: a small perturbation of the budget line
through either observation would eliminate the problem. Hence we might want to consider
this an insignificant violation of the maximization model.
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Figure 1. A "small" violation of GARP.
The notion of what is or is not significant implicitly relies on a statistical model of
how the data were generated and what are the possible sources of error. In this paper I
will investigate several proposed answers to this question. Some of these proposed answers
have interesting implications for parametric demand analysis as well which we will consider
at the end of the paper.
1. Finding the minimal perturbation
In Varian (1985) I examined how one might formalize the concept of significant violations
in the context of measurement error. I will describe this method here in reasonably general
terms, since it applies to a wide variety of problems involving testing inequality restrictions.
Let r be a vector of observations of consumer choices. The maintained hypothesis is
that
x = X + e,
where X is the vector of true values and e is a vector of error terms. For simplicity we
take the components of a to be IID Normal, with mean of zero and variance o2. The null
hypothesis that we wish to test is that X lies in some region H. In the case of revealed
preference analysis, H is simply the subset of R" for which the data satisfy the revealed
preference inequalities.
It is important to recognize that in our applications H will typically be a subset with
the same dimension as the ambient space. This is in contrast to the standard theory
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of hypothesis testing in which the null hypothesis usually imposes restrictions of smaller
dimensionality.
In Varian (1985) I proposed the following test statistic
T = minZ(x= - zi)2/a2
ti=1
such that z E H.
This statistic is proportional to the (minimum) distance from x to the set H in the Eu-
clidean metric. Intuitively, this number should be "small" if the data were in fact generated
by maximization.
Standard hypothesis testing methodology would suggest that we calculate the distri-
bution of this statistic under the null hypothesis and identify the critical region. The
problem is how to calculate the sampling distribution of T. It is well-known that the
sampling distribution for the optimized value function can be a very complicated function
of error terms entering in the constraints.
However, the following simple observation makes at least some calculations possible:
under the null hypothesis the distance from the observed data, x, to the true data, X, is
at least as great as the value T, since under the null hypothesis X is an element of H and
T is the minimal distance from x to H. It follows that for any critical value C,
Prob{T > C} <Prob [}>C .
i=1
Note that the probability on the right-hand side of this inequality can be calculated; under
the null hypothesis, it is simply a x2 variable with n degrees of freedom.
Suppose that we choose a test of size a and find the critical value Ca such that
Prob {§_> Es2/a 2 > C"} = a. Then we know from the above inequality that
Prob{T > Ca} < a.
Hence if we reject the null hypothesis when T > C, we are certain that the probability
of rejecting the null when it is true is less than a. Hence our proposed testi has size of 'at
most a.
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This proposed test has some advantages and disadvantages. Among its advantages are
the following:
" It is a very general approach that can be applied in a large variety of cases.
* It actually identifies a perturbation of the data that satisfies the appropriate revealed
preference conditions, and which can be interpreted as a maximum likelihood estimator
of the true choices. (On this last point, see Varian (1985).)
Among its disadvantages are:
* One need to specify a priori the error variances.
e The test may be difficult to compute, even for relatively small data sets.
I find the last objection the most serious. If there are n observations, then finding the
minimal perturbation of the data will involve solving a quadratic programming problem
with n2 constraints. This means that problems with more than 50 or so observations will
demand significant computer resources for their solution.
Of course the problems under examination typically have a very special structure, and
a deeper analysis could provide much improved algorithms. However, this computational
problem seems significant enough that it warrants thinking about alternative approaches.
2. The Afriat index
The last section emphasized the idea that the "error term" in the optimization was due
to measurement error or other sorts of "observational" problems. In this section I want to
examine a different approach to the problem of how to account for violations of maximizing
behavior. The approach is based on a notion of "almost maximizing" behavior that was
first described by Afriat (1967). Initially I will describe the goodness-of-fit measure without
referring to a statistical model of error generation, and then turn to a statistical model.
Afriat's measure is calculated in the following manner. For a given set of numbers
(et), t = 1,... ,T, with 0 _< et < 1, define an extension of the standard direct revealed
prefcrence relation by
x' 1R? .r' if and only if etptz' p'tz'.I
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If et = 1 this is the standard revealed preference relation; if et= 0 the relation is vacuous
in the sense that observation t cannot be revealed preferred to any other observation. As
et varies from 1 to 0 the number of observations revealed preferred to other observations
monotonically decreases.
The number et is known as the efficiency index, and it can be thought of as how much
less the potential expenditure on a bundle x8 has to be before we will consider it worse
than the observed choice x'. If e t is .90, for example, we will only count bundles whose cost
is less than 90% of an observed choice x as being revealed worse than x*. Said another
way: if e' is .90 and x" would cost only 5% less than xt, we would not consider this a
significant enough different to conclude that x was preferred by the consumer to x'. We
are allowing the consumer a "margin of error" of (1 - et).
Given an arbitrary set of data (p t , xt), let us choose a set of efficiency indices (et) that
are as close as possible to 1 in some norm. If the data satisfy the revealed preference
conditions exactly, then we can choose et = 1 for all t = 1,... , T. If we choose et = 0 for
all t = 1,... , T, then the data vacuously satisfy the revealed preference conditions, since
no observation is revealed preferred to any other. Thus for any reasonable norm, there will
be some set of (e*) that are as close as possible to 1 in some norm that will summarize
"how close" the observed choices are to maximizing choices.
In Afriat's (1967) original treatment of this idea, he considered choosing a single e that
applied to all observations, rather than a different et for each observation. We refer to
this as a single index model as opposed to the multiple index model described above. The
advantage of Afriat's original proposal is that it is much easier to compute a single index
e than the multiple indices (e t ).
Houtman and Maks (1987) suggest the following binary search. Start with e = 1 and
test for violations of revealed preference using Warshall's algorithm as described in Varian
(1982a). If the data fail to satisfy the strong axiom, try e = 1/2. If e = 1/2 doesn't work,
try e = 1/4. If e = 1/2 does work, try e = 3/4, and so on. After n revealed preference
tests, you are within 1/2" of the actual efficiency index.
Computing the set of efficiency indices that are as close as possible to 1 in some norm
is substantially more difficult. If we choose a quadratic norm, for example, we would have
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so solve a problem such as:
T
E = mi (et -1)2(1
et=1
subject to the constraint that the revealed preference relation Re satisfies the Strong
Axiom. This approach is significantly more demanding from a computational perspective.
3. The sampling distribution of the Afriat index
Afriat's original definition of the efficiency index was motivated by considerations of the
goodness-of-fit of the optimization model. It provides a reasonable measure of how well a
given set of data satisfy the optimization hypothesis. But without some specification of
the reasons why the data fail to satisfy the optimization hypothesis in the first place, it
is hard to know whether we have a significant or an insignificant violation of the model.
However, if we formulate a stochastic model of describing how the data were generated,
then we can view the Afriat index as a statistic and ask the usual sort of questions about
the distribution of this statistic.
My preliminary investigations indicated that it is very difficult to say anything of much
use analytically, except in very simple cases, so I have proceed to simulate the sampling
distribution of the Afriat index under a standard stochastic model. Here I will present
some of my initial findings.
I begin by constructing a random set of prices. I then calculate the set of demands
implied using a parametric system of demand equations. In the particular set of simula-
tions I describe below I used a CES utility function with parameter p. I then added an
Normally distributed error term to the demand for each good. Finally, I took these data
and calculated the implied Afriat index. I repeated this process a hundred times, and
examined the resulting frequency distribution of the Afriat index.
My major concern was how the index varied with respect to the two major unknowns
of the problem-the tastes, as measured by the CES parameter p, and the variance of
the error term. Charts 1 and 2 present typical examples of the sampling distributions for
dIilferet values of the error terms and CES parameter.
As you can see from the tables, it is quite unusual to observe a value of the Afriat
efficiency index less than about .8(93 13/16) under the null hypotheses used to simulate
6








1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Value of Afriat Index (1 6ths)
Chart 1. Sampling distribution of the Afriat index (p = .05).
the sampling distribution. Put somewhat differently: if the stochastic model is correct,
then a value of the Afriat index less than .8 is strong evidence against the null hypothesis
of utility maximization.
The method of simulating the sampling distribution under the null hypothesis can be
extended in several directions. In any particular problem it would make sense to condition
on the observed prices rather than generate the prices randomly, as I did in my simulations.
Furthermore, if a specific alternative hypothesis is available, it makes sense to simulate the
sampling distribution under that alternative. The resulting sampling distributions can be
used for power calculations, as in Bronars (1987), or for calculating the posterior odds in
favor of the null, as in the Bayesian approach to hypothesis testing.
The major difficulty that I have with this approach is that the null hypothesis is not
really a nonparametric hypothesis. It is unfortunately a rather sharp parametric hypoth-
esis: the observed choices are a perturbation of a particular CES utility function. I'm not
sure exactly how to solve this problem. One could postulate a prior distribution over the
parameter p and then (numerically) integrate the sampling distribution over this nuisance
7
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Chart 2. Sampling distribution of the Afriat index (p = 4.0).
parameter. Although this procedure seems theoretically sound, it appears somewhat ad
hoc and computational demanding to carry out in practice.
My preferred approach is to estimate the CES parameter p and the variance of the
error term using standard parametric methods and use these numbers to construct the
simulations of the sampling distributions described above. This also suffers from the defect
of being somewhat ad hoc but at least it seems like a sensible thing to do.
4. A characterization of the efficiency indices
There is a characterization of the set of (et) that minimize some norm that will be useful
in what follows. In order to describe it, we need some formal definitions.
As above, define the relation R° by x' Re x iff etpt xt> ptx, and let R, be the transitive
closure of this relation. Then define GARPe to mean
x" Re x t implies etptx* _< p~rx*.
If et = 1 for all t then this reduces to the standard definition of GARP.
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Here is another way to state this definition: if some data (pt,xt, et ) satisfy GAEPe,
then
for all x* Re ' we have etptxt < px.
This statement can be written as
e' tfor all z* R, X*.
If we attempt to choose a set of (e t ) that are on the average as close as possible to 1, then
this inequality will typically be binding for some observation s so we have:
e = min .(2)
e Rzt ptzt
Note that this is not really an "operational" way to determine e*, since et is implicitly
involved in the relation Re. Nevertheless, the characterization is still useful, as we shall
see in the next section.
5. Parametric methods
The characterization of (et) described in the last section is useful because it can be extended
to a novel way to estimate parametric demand systems. Suppose that one is willing to
postulate that some observed demand behavior was generated by the maximization of a
particular parametric utility function u(x, /3), where 3 is a vector of parameters.
Let >e be the preferences generated by the utility function u(x, 3). Then it is natural





All we have done is to replace the partial order Re by the total order e.
Using some constructs from duality theory allows for an easier statement of this defi-





In words, the money metric utility function measures the minimum expenditure at prices
p the consumer would need to be as well off as he would be consuming the bundle x. For
more on the money metric utility function see Samuelson (1974), King (1982), and Varian
(1984). If utility is parameterized by ,Q, then the money metric utility function depends
on the same parameters and we write m(p, x, ,#).




In words, m(pt, xt,#) gives the minimum expenditure necessary to achieve utility u(x*, /)
while ptxt gives the expenditure actually observed. Roughly speaking, the consumer is
"wasting" a fraction 1 - it of his money.
An index of the degree of violation of maximization in the data set could be given by
T (m(ptxt, 3) _ 2
t= Z p -1 .
This definition is directly analogous to equation (1).
The discussion to this point has proceeded under the assumption that /3 was known.
But what if 3 is unknown? Then we would like to have an estimate of #/-an estimate that
provides the best fit to the maximizing model. A natural estimate is to find that value of /3
that minimizes the degree of violation of maximizing behavior as measured by the index I.
This makes the average value of et as close as possible to 1, using the sum-of-squared-error
norm. I believe that this estimator has several desirable characteristics.
First, it uses a sensible economic norm for goodness-of-fit. Conventional estimators of
demand parameters use the sum-of-squared errors of the observed and predicted quantities
demand, or some variant on this. But this has little economic content; a large difference
between predicted and observed demand can easily be consistent with a small difference
in utility. This is depicted in Figure 2. Here the observed choice is far from the predicted
choice in Euclidean distance, but quite close in terms of money metric utility. The model
is a had fit in terms of Euclidean distance, but a good fit in the sense that the consumer











Figure 2. This is a good fit in terms of money metric utility although it is a bad fit in
terms of the usual error terms.
Second, the minimized value of the objective function gives a meaningful economic
measure of how close the observed choices are to maximizing choice for the particular
parametric form involved. If the average value of et is .95 for example, then it is meaningful
to say that the observed choice behavior was 95 percent as efficient as maximizing behavior.
Third, the mechanics of the estimation problem may be much simpler than they are
using the conventional approach. Economic theory imposes the restriction that a money
metric utility function must be an increasing, linearly homogeneous, and concave function
of prices. These constraints are not terribly difficult to impose on the maximization prob-
lem. By contrast theory implies that a system of demand equations must have a symmetric
negative semidefinite Slutsky substitution matrix. Imposing this restriction involves im-
posing nonlinear cross equation restrictions on a system of equations. In general this is a
difficult thing to do.
Fourth, this same method can easily be applied to estimation of production relation-
ships. If one starts with a null hypothesis of cost minimization, say, then it makes sense to
measure the goodness-of-fit of estimation procedure by comparing the actual costs to the
minimum costs implied by the estimated parameters. If it is thought that errors in opti-
mization are a significant component of the error term, then it can make sense to estimate
the parameters by choosing parameter estimates that minimize the difference between the
observed costs and the minimum costs.
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6. An example
In order to examine the money metric goodness-of-fit measure described in the last sec-
tion, I tried an experiment using U.S. aggregate consumption data. The data was taken
from the Citibank economic database and consisted of aggregate consumption of durables,
nondurables, and services from 1947 to 1987. (See Table 3.)
I estimated the parameters of a Cobb-Douglas utility system using three different tech-
niques. The first technique was simply to take the average expenditure share of each good.
The second technique was to estimate the regression x = aie/pi, where e is the total
expenditure on the three goods. I used Zellner's seemingly unrelated regression technique
and imposed the normalization that a1 + a2 + a3 = 1. (Estimating the three equations
separately gave almost the same estimates.) The third technique was to determine the
values of the parameters that maximized the goodness-of-fit, as measured by difference
between the money metric utility and the actual expenditure. The first two methods are
straightforward, but a description of the third method may be in order.
Let us derive the money metric utility function associated with the Cobb-Douglas utility
function u(xi, x2 , x 3 ) = a* xx aXs. For algebraic convenience we impose the normalization
that the exponents sum to 1. The money metric utility function is defined to be the amount
of money that it takes as some prices (p 1, P2, p3) to choose an optimal bundle that has the
same utility as the bundle (xl,x2,X3).
If we let m be the necessary amount of money, we have the equation
x aia2 a (aim a (a 2 m *aa m )as
1 2 3  P2 P3
Solving for m we have
m(p, x) = ai~l a a2a3a8(pixi)a1(p2 X 2 )a2(p 3 x 2 )a
3  (3)
(For a different derivation, see Varian (1984), page 129.) Taking logs, we can write this
equation as
lnrm(p, x) = -ai ln a1 - a2 1n a2 - asln as+ aln px1+ a2 1n p2x2 + asn Paa. (4)
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We suppose that the log of the actual expenditure in period t, in et, is equal to the log
of the expenditure minimizing amount, In m(pt, x t ), plus an error term representing the
optimization error. Using equation (4), we have
Ine t = -a 1Iln a1 - a2ln a2 -a 3 lna 3 s+-ai lnptxi + a2lInjpx +a31n p34x + et.
I estimated this equation using the nonlinear least squares routine in MicroTSP, imposing




Method ai a2  a3
Expenditure shares 0.152 0.461 0.387
Regression 0.129 0.358 0.413
Nonlinear Least Squares 0.150 0.472 0.378
The first thing to observe is that the three methods give somewhat different answers.
This is simply a consequence of the fact that the estimates which "fit the data best" depend
on what measure of goodness-of-fit you use. The regression estimates that minimizes the
sum of squared deviations from the observed demands will not in general be the same
as the estimates that minimize the squared difference between money metric utility and
actual expenditure.
It is surprising that the expenditure share method and the money metric method give
very similar estimates, especially since the expenditure share estimate involves a system
of equations while the money metric estimation involves only a single equation. Of course,
ultimately it is a single sum-of-squares that is minimized in the regression technique, so
perhaps this is not so surprising after all.
The computed values of the money metric utility function for each of the different
parameters are given in Table 2, along with the percentage difference between money metric
utility and the actual expenditure for each of the three different estimation methods.
Note that these percent differences are very small, at least for the expenditure share
estimates and the NLS estimates. Using the expenditure share methods the largest differ-
ence is 7.4 %, and the majority of the differences are less than one percent. The average
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difference is 2%. This suggests that the observed aggregate demand behavior is not very
different from optimizing behavior, at least when measured in units of "wasted expendi-
ture."
Similar results hold for the nonlinear least squares estimates. Here the average value of
the error is only 1.9%. The regression estimates do much poorer, resulting in an average
error of about 5%.
It is worth noting that the residuals in all of the estimates are positive in each observa-
tion; this is as it should be if the optimizing model is to make any sense since the minimum
expenditure to achieve a given level of utility must always be less than an arbitrary ex-
penditure.
7. Summary
In the first part of this paper I discussed some ways to measure goodness-of-fit in a non-
parametric context. It appears that the Afriat index is a reasonable measure, and that
it is not difficult to calculate it's sampling distribution by Monte-Carlo methods. This
sampling distribution can be used to test hypotheses in the standard way.
The second part of the paper showed how the money metric utility function can be
used to construct a goodness-of-fit measure. For the data set examined here, it appears
that aggregate consumption behavior is not terribly far from maximizing behavior, at least
in the money-metric norm.
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